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It is a high honor for me to deliver a Lecture established in the mem-
ory of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. I clerked for the Justice, and I have
ever since cherished him as a Master. I speak now not of his legendary per-
sonal qualities, of his warmth, empathy, humor, and generosity, but of his
professional virtues. The law was to Justice Brennan simultaneously an
institution of great internal integrity and a powerful instrument of moral
passion. These two perspectives are so often divorced, one from the other,
that their union into a single coherent vision has been to me a continual
source of profound inspiration.
When I was asked by the Brennan Center to deliver this Lecture, I
selected the topic of ordinances that prohibit discrimination on the basis of
personal appearance. I had no particular thought of Justice Brennan's work
in mind when I made this choice, for I had long been fascinated by the
seemingly utopian aspirations of these regulations. As I worked my way
through the subject, however, I found, much to my surprise, that at the end
of the road I had once again come face to face with Justice Brennan's
achievements.
One of Brennan's most important and most controversial opinions is
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,' in which he held in an opinion
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for a bare five Justices that Title VII did not prohibit affirmative action
programs by private employers. Without Weber, we would live in a very
different and less integrated nation than we do now, and yet Weber has
always been vulnerable to intense attack for its use of legislative history
and for its supposed betrayal of American antidiscrimination law. One way
of understanding this Lecture is as an invitation to comprehend the nature
of Justice Brennan's accomplishment in that case.
I
Before we can appreciate the exceptional nature of Weber, however,
we must pursue a story that begins in Santa Cruz in January of 1992, when
the City Council proposed an ordinance that would prohibit discrimination
against persons on the basis of "personal appearance.?"2 First advanced by a
Santa Cruz group called the Body Image Task Force, the proposed law
quickly became known in the media as "the 'purple hair ordinance' or the
'ugly ordinance.'"' It provoked an intense and raucous4 controversy about
the merits of what was called "anti-lookism."5
Anti-lookism cuts deeply into the social fabric. Social relationships
characteristically transpire through the medium of appearances; an ability
to interpret the many meanings conveyed by appearances is required for
fluency in the language of social life. Balzac, for example, once observed
that the "mind of a man could be ascertained by the manner in which he
holds his cane."6 Because such judgments are the stuff of ordinary life,
Oscar Wilde famously quipped that "[i]t is only shallow people who do not
judge by appearances. The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the
invisible."7 The presentation of appearances in everyday life is not merely
a matter of the external surfaces of the self, for appearances are also con-
nected to identity. A postmodern sensibility would be tempted to press this
point very far, as for example does Susan Sontag when she observes that
"our manner of appearing is our manner of being. The mask is the face."'
2. David Ratner, Santa Cruz Gives Tentative OK to Lmv on Personal Appearance, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 15, 1992, at Al.
3. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 65-66
(1995).
4. See California in Brief, Santa Cruz: Council Backs Ban on Looks Bias, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13,
1992, at B8.
5. Editorial, Santa Cruz' Weirdocracy, WASH. TImm. Jan. 21, 1992, at F2.
6. "L'esprit d'un homme se devine hs la manisre dont il porte sa canne." HONORE DE BALZAC.
TRAITA DE LA VIE ELEGANTE 35 (1922).
7. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTUt OF DORIAN GRAY 22 (Isobel Murray ed.. Oxford 1981) (189 1).
8. SUSAN SONTAG, AGAINST INTERPRETATION 18 (Delta 1981) (1965); see also JUDITH
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 141 (1990):
If gender attributes ... are not expressive but performative, then these attributes
effectively constitute the identity they are said to express or reveal.... If gender attributes
and acts. the various ways in which a body shows or produces its cultural signification, are
[Vol. 88:1
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The draft Santa Cruz ordinance proposed to render appearances
invisible. It would do so not merely in the context of the state's treatment
of its citizens, but also in the context of ordinary employment and housing
transactions among private persons. It is no wonder, then, that the ordi-
nance prompted cries of outrage. "If someone has 14 earrings in their ears
and their nose-and who knows where else-and spiky green hair and
smells like a skunk," commented Kathy Manoff, owner of a small restau-
rant, "I don't know why I have to hire them."9 Newspaper editorials
scorned the ordinance as extending "the power of the state over private
judgments that are perfectly normal discriminatory responses to human
eccentricities."'" Columnist Joseph Farah wondered, "[L]et's say you're
a newspaper editor looking for someone to cover the police beat. An
experienced professional journalist wants the job, but he shows up for the
interview wearing a dress. Does he get a chance to be our ace crime
reporter?""
Supporters of the proposed ordinance, however, insisted that it merely
forbade superficial judgments based upon "stereotypes."' 2 They argued that
because the real worth of persons did not inhere in their external appear-
ance, important decisions regarding employment and housing ought not to
depend upon such an irrelevant characteristic, particularly when decisions
based upon appearance so often merely express "simple bigotry."'3 The
efforts of employers to "control the look of their workforce" were said to
"smack of the kind of mentality that kept blacks and other minorities out of
the public eye for years until civil rights protections were enacted."' 4
performative, then there is no preexisting identity by which an act or attribute might be
measured ....
9. Richard C. Paddock, California Album; Santa Cruz Grants Anti-Bias Protection to the Ugly,
L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1992, at A3.
10. Santa Cruz' Weirdocracy, supra note 5.
11. Joseph Farah, Job Bias Law Is Stretched to Cover the Ugly, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at B7.
12. David Ratner, Appearance Law Faces 2nd Vote in Santa Cruz, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 16,1992, at
A15.
13. Martha Groves, Looks Won't Mean a Lot if Anti-Bias Law Is Approved, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1992, at A3 (quoting Dawn Atkins, an anthropologist and member of the Body Image Task Force). One
reporter quoted Sara Leonard, "who prefers to be called Sara Hell," concerning the misleading nature
of external appearances. Hell said,
[S]he had been turned away from restaurants and jobs because of the combined effect of her
black leather, dangling skeleton earring and long lock of fuchsia hair on an otherwise shaved
head.
The tattoo has not helped. She said that despite her bachelor's degree, she has had a hard
time finding work. "Because I have a tattoo on my head, I'm treated like a cretin," she said.
Katherine Bishop, Santa Cruz Journal; With a Risumi in Hand And a Ring in the Nose, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 1992, at A18.
14. Stephen G. Hirsch, Santa Cruz Law Could Be Attacked for Vagueness; Proposed Ordinance
Would Bar Bias Based on Appearance, THE RECORDER, Jan. 17, 1992, at I (referring to the views of
ACLU attorney Matthew Coles). Opponents of the ordinance particularly resented this characterization,
arguing that "[tihe focus of expanding and securing rights ought to be placed on those conditions truly
irrelevant to a person's character and ability, such as race. But this puts hair color and skin color on the
20001
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When carefully parsed, proponents of the proposed Santa Cruz ordi-
nance made (at least) three distinct kinds of claims. The first concerns
equality. Blinding employers and landlords to appearance was seen by
some as a way of making everyone equal in that regard. Thus Smiley
Rogers, "a sales clerk at Bead It, a popular bead store, who ha[d] a full
beard, tie[d] his long hair in a ponytail and sport[ed] a button" reading
Proudly Serving My Corporate Masters, expressed his "love" for the ordi-
nance because "[iut gets everyone down to an equal level."'5
The logic of effacing appearance to achieve equality is explored in
Kurt Vonnegut's short story, Harrison Bergeron, which begins:
The year was 2081, and everybody was finally equal. They
weren't only equal before God and the law. They were equal every
which way. Nobody was smarter than anybody else. Nobody was
better looking than anybody else. Nobody was stronger or quicker
than anybody else. All this equality was due to the 211 th, 212th,
and 213th Amendments to the Constitution, and to the unceasing
vigilance of agents of the United States Handicapper General. ' 6
Vonnegut postulates a world in which government officials make everyone
equal in every respect: Those who are graceful must wear weights; those
who are smart must be distracted to reduce their intelligence to normal lev-
els; and those who are beautiful must wear masks. The goal is to create a
society that is "absolutely uncompetitive."' 7
Vonnegut envisions this world as a nightmare dystopia, in which
human excellence, all that is fine and beautiful, has been brought "down to
an equal level." He imagines a ballet in which the dancers are "no better
than anybody else would have been .... They were burdened with
sashweights and bags of birdshot, and their faces were masked, so that no
one, seeing a free and graceful gesture or a pretty face, would feel like
something the cat drug in."'8 If everything is equal, Vonnegut implies, then
nothing much matters anyway.
Equality in this stringent sense was never, of course, the aim of the
proposed Santa Cruz ordinance. From its earliest draft, it specifically per-
mitted employment decisions to be based on appearance if "relevant to job
performance." 9 The author of the ordinance could thus defend it on the
grounds that "[p]eople should be judged on the basis of real criteria, their
same moral plane." James Lileks, Equality for the, uh, Different, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TmiB., Jan. 19,
1992, at 25A.
15. Paddock, supra note 9.
16. KURT VONNEGUT, JR, Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7 (Dell
Publishing 1970) (1950). For another fictional study of equality and appearance, see L.P. HARTLEY,
FACIAL JUSTICE (1960).
17. VONNEGUT, supra note 16, at 10.
18. Id. at 8.
19. Ratner, supra note 2.
[Vol. 88:1
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ability to perform the job or pay the rent, and that should be the sole
criteria."" "What this ordinance is really saying," he explained, "is, hire
the best-qualified person."' 2' The Santa Cruz ordinance was therefore aimed
not at equality, but at equal opportunity, at allowing all to compete on
equal terms for the title of "best-qualified person."
An alternative claim advanced by the ordinance's proponents con-
cerns personal autonomy. A person's capacity to control the presentation
of himself, through choices of hair color, tattoos, or clothing, is certainly
an important form of self-expression, too precious, it was argued, to be
controlled by employers or landlords.22 One can recognize this theme in the
attitude of a performance artist named Gabriel at the city council meeting
considering the Santa Cruz ordinance:
A striking-looking woman with a partially shaved head and a
thin black diagonal line drawn across her face, she said she was
tired of being portrayed as an extremist.
"It' s regarded as a threat," she said.
She rejected those who would judge her and sought to up the
ante.
"I wish I had blue hair tonight," she said. 'There's such a
national fear of people having blue hair."'
The theme of self-expression, however, rests on the seemingly para-
doxical notion that persons have the right both to use their appearance to
communicate meanings, including messages of "threat," and simultane-
ously to require others to ignore these messages. If we concentrate on
employment relationships, we can see that the self-determination of the
employee must be set against the autonomy of the employer to present a
particular image of her business. Employers thus quite reasonably objected
20. Paddock, supra note 9 (quoting City Councilman Neal Coonerty).
21. Martha Groves, supra note 13 (quoting City Councilman Neal Coonerty).
22. This theme is quite common in the numerous constitutional cases that challenge the right of
the state to set standards regulating hair length. The classic statement of the position is by no less a
figure than Judge John Minor Wisdom:
To me the right to wear one's hair as one pleases, although unspecified in our Bill of Rights,
is a "fundamental" right protected by the Due Process Clause. Hair is a purely personal
matter-a matter of personal style which for centuries has been one aspect of the manner in
which we hold ourselves out to the rest of the world. Like other elements of costume, hair is a
symbol: of elegance, of efficiency, of affinity and association, of non-conformity and
rejection of traditional values. A person shorn of the freedom to vary the length and style of
his hair is forced against his will to hold himself out symbolically as a person holding ideas
contrary, perhaps, to ideas he holds most dear. Forced dress, including forced hair style,
humiliates the unwilling complier, forces him to submerge his individuality in the
"undistracting" mass, and in general smacks of the exaltation of organization over member,
unit over component, and state over individual. I always thought this country does not
condone such repression.
Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 621 (5th Cir. 1972) (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
23. Jane Meredith Adams, Califonzia City Faces Raging Dress Code War, Cmi. TRIB., Feb. 16,
1992, at C4.
2000]
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to the theme of self-expression on the grounds that "[i]f someone looks and
acts as if they don't care what others think, they risk being rejected."24
This line of logic was apparently convincing to the drafters of
the Santa Cruz ordinance, for in April 1992, they ultimately enacted an
ordinance that prohibited discrimination on the basis of "physical
characteristic," which was defined as "a bodily condition or bodily
characteristic of any person which is from birth, accident, or disease, or
from any natural physical development, or any other event outside the
control of that person including individual physical mannerisms." As
actually passed, therefore, the Santa Cruz ordinance proscribed discrimi-
nation based only on aspects of bodily appearance that were beyond a per-
son's control. Employers were thus free to evaluate employees based upon
the messages conveyed by their choice of clothes, tattoos, or artificial hair
color.
26
As reformulated, the Santa Cruz ordinance essentially rests on a
third claim, that of fairness. Just as it is "simple bigotry" to discriminate
against persons merely because of the accident of race, so it is unjust to
discriminate against persons merely because of physical characteristics
imposed upon them by birth, accident, or disease. The case is different,
however, if these characteristics are relevant to the requirements of a
job. Thus, the ordinance forbids only "arbitrary discrimination.., based
on ... physical characteristic"; that is, discrimination not required by "a
bona fide occupational qualification."27
To capture the full force of this logic, one need only recall the
wrenching letter to Nathanael West's Miss Lonelyhearts:
Dear Miss Lonelyhearts-
I am sixteen years old now and I dont know what to do and
would appreciate it if you could tell me what to do. When I was a
little girl it was not so bad because I got used to the kids on the
block makeing fun of me, but now I would like to have boyfriends
24. Id. (quoting Businessman Noel Smith).
25. SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 9.83.01, 9.83.02(13) (1992) ("An Ordinance of the City
of Santa Cruz Adding Chapter 9.83 to the Santa Cruz Municipal Code Pertaining to the Prohibition of
Discrimination").
26. The District of Columbia, it should be noted, does prohibit discrimination on the basis of
"personal appearance' which it defines as "the outward appearance of any person, irrespective of sex,
with regard to bodily condition or characteristics, manner or style of dress, and manner or style of
personal grooming, including, but not limited to, hair style and beards." D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501, 1-
2502(22) (1999).
27. SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 9.83.01, 9.83.08(6) The full list of the ordinance's
prohibitions reads:
It is the intent of the city council... to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity
of all persons to be free from all forms of arbitrary discrimination, including discrimination
based on age, race, color, creed, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, marital status,
sex, gender, sexual orientation, height, weight or physical characteristic.
Id. § 9.83.01.
[Vol. 88:1
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like the other girls and go out on Saturday nites, but no boy will
take me because I was born without a nose-although I am a good
dancer and have a nice shape and my father buys me pretty clothes.
I sit and look at myself all day and cry. I have a big hole in the
middle of my face that scares people even myself so I cant blame
the boys for not wanting to take me out. My mother loves me, but
she crys terrible when she looks at me.




If the law can't supply "Desperate" a boyfriend, at least it can make sure
that frightened employers don't deprive her of the equal opportunity to
obtain ajob for which she is qualified.
One need not evoke extreme cases of grotesque disfigurement to
appreciate the problem. Studies abound that attractive persons receive
manifold "undeserved" benefits in life as compared to unattractive per-
sons: Juries treat them more favorably, 29 as do teachers30 and strangers .3 A
recent study in The American Economic Review demonstrated that
"lookism" exerts a powerful force on the labor market, so that for both men
and women "wages of people with below-average looks are lower than
those of average looking workers; and there is a premium in wages for
good-looking people."32 The "wage differential between attractive and ugly
people is about 10% for both sexes. 33
Facts like these have led at least one legal article to argue that because
"appearance, like race and gender, is almost always an illegitimate
employment criterion ... that ... is frequently used to make decisions
based on personal dislike or prejudicial assumptions rather than
actual merit," the law should "protect people against employment
discrimination on the basis of largely immutable aspects of bodily and
facial appearance."'
28. NATHANAEL WEST, Miss LONELYHEARTS & THE DAY OF THE LocusT 170-71 (New
Directions Publishing 1962) (1933).
29. See Cookie Stephan & Judy Corder Tully, The Influence of Phn'sical Attractiveness of a
Plaintiff on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 101 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 149 (1977).
30. See Margaret M. Clifford & Elaine Walster, The Effect of Physical Attractiveness on Teacher
Expectations, 46 Soc. EDUC. 248 (1973).
31. See Karen Dion et al., What is Beautiful is Good, 24 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 285
(1972); David W. Wilson, Helping Behavior and Physical Attractiveness, 104 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 313
(1978). For a general discussion, see GORDON L. PATZER, THE PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS
PHENOMENA (1985).
32. Daniel S. Hamermesh & Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market, 84 Am. ECON. REV.
1174,1174,1192 (1994).
33. Robert J. Barro, So You Want to Hire the Beautiful. Well. Why Not?, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 16,
1998, at 18.
34. Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on
the Basis of PhysicalAppearance, 100 HARV. L. REv. 2035, 2035 (1987).
2000]
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When TRB of The New Republic read this article, he was both
intrigued and troubled. He was intrigued because he recognized that "[t]he
logic is impeccable": "Appearance, like race and sex and physical
handicap, is an immutable characteristic. Like these other disadvantages,
an unattractive appearance usually has no connection to your ability to do
the job. Therefore, discrimination on this basis is just as unfair and should
be outlawed."'35 Yet TRB was also troubled by the vague sense that this
impeccable logic was somehow spinning out of control. What about
"prejudice on the basis of a whiny voice?" he asked. Or "[w]hat about
'grouch liberation ?'' 36
There are, of course, many reasons to be concerned about the actual
operation of laws prohibiting discrimination based upon appearance. If one
asks about the enforcement of such laws, for example, the potential for
oppressive state intrusion can come to seem quite ominous. But at root
TRB was unsettled not because of these practical difficulties, but because
of an inarticulate, nagging suspicion that laws prohibiting discrimination
based upon appearance were somehow a reductio ad absurdum of the basic
logic of American antidiscrimination law. Although powerfully compelling
when applied to race or gender, that same logic seemed to lose its footing
when applied to appearance.
In the remainder of this Lecture, I would like to pursue TRB's nag-
ging doubt. It is my hope that this inquiry can expose important aspects of
the fundamental logic of American antidiscrimination law that would not
quite be visible when viewed from other, more normalized perspectives. I
will explore these questions chiefly in the context of laws prohibiting dis-
crimination in employment, which, like the Santa Cruz ordinance, apply to
private persons. But I shall also refer to antidiscrimination principles as
they appear in constitutional law.
II
Antidiscrimination law in America characteristically presents itself
according to a very definite logic. It is a logic that springs from a firm
sense of the social reality of prejudice. Antidiscrimination law seeks to
neutralize widespread forms of prejudice that pervasively disadvantage
persons based upon inaccurate judgments about their worth or capacities.
The unfairness of prejudice is particularly manifest when it is directed
against immutable traits, like race or sex. But prejudice can be unfair even
if it is directed against traits that are within the control of a person.
American antidiscrimination laws, for example, typically prohibit dis-
crimination based upon religion and marital status, even though neither
trait is "immutable." In this regard, obesity is an interesting borderline
35. TRB, The Tyranny of Beauty, 197 NEw REPUBLIC, OCt. 12, 1987, at 4.
36. Id.
[Vol. 88:1
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case. It is plain that there is widespread prejudice against the obese, 7 so
that obesity is a deeply stigmatizing characteristic. Antidiscrimination laws
sometimes forbid discrimination based upon obesity when (and only when)
the characteristic is conceptualized as a disability that is beyond the control
of a person;38 sometimes they prohibit such discrimination if obesity is
categorized as a disability, even if the disability is partially within the con-
trol of a person; 39 and sometimes, as in the case of the Santa Cruz ordi-
nance, antidiscrimination laws flatly forbid discrimination based upon
"weight.""* Such statutes regard prejudice against the obese as unfair even
if obesity is completely within the voluntary control of a person. Although
this is not the occasion to elaborate the point, I suspect that legal judgments
of unfairness depend upon whether a stigmatizing attribute is viewed as
somehow essential or integral to a person, as is their religion.
Prejudice against a stigmatizing characteristic, such as race or sex, can
manifest itself through invidious judgments of the "differential worth" of
persons who display the characteristic." or it can manifest itself through
"faulty" judgments about the capacities of such persons 2 American
antidiscrimination law understands itself as negating such prejudice by
eliminating or carefully scrutinizing the use of stigmatizing characteristics
as a ground for judgment. The classic constitutional formulation of this
perspective is Justice White's opinion for the Court in Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,43 in which he writes that statutory classifica-
tions of "race, alienage, or national origin"
are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to
reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened
class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For these reasons
and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by
legislative means, these laws are subject to strict scrutiny and will
37. See Werner J. Cahnman, The Stigma of Obesity, 9 Soc. Q. 283 (1968); Carey Goldberg,
"People of Size" Gather to Promote Fat Acceptance: Group Celebrates Idea of Liberation, N.Y.
Timns, July 29, 1999, at A12. One study in The New England Journal of Medicine purported to show
that similarly qualified applicants to prestigous colleges were significantly less likely to be admitted if
they were obese. Helen Canning & Jean Mayer, Obesity-Its Possible Effect on College Acceptance,
275 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1172 (1966).
38. See, e.g., Greene v. Union Pac. R.R., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5 (W.D. Wash. 1981); Cassista v.
Community Foods, Inc., 5 Cal. 4th 1050, 1063-65 (1993); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth,
448 A.2d 701,707 (Pa. 1982).
39. See. e.g., Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1993); State Div. of Human
Rights v. Xerox Corp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 106, 110 (1985).
40. See SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 9.83.01, 9.83.02(13) (1992). The state of Michigan
prohibits employers from discriminating based upon "religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex,
height, weight, or marital status." MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 37.2202(l)(a) (West 1999).
41. Paul Brest, The Supreme Cour& 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7 (1976).
42. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 9 (1954).
43. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest....
Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a
heightened standard of review. That factor generally provides no
sensible ground for differential treatment. "[W]hat differentiates
sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical
disability.., is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society".... Rather
than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing
benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very
likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men
and women. A gender classification fails unless it is substantially
related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.'
Judicial interpretation of Title VII, which is the portion of the Federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,"'4 displays a similar
orientation. "In passing Title VII," the Court has said, "Congress made the
simple but momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national
origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of
employees. 46 The point of rendering such factors irrelevant is to "target"
and eliminate "stubborn but irrational prejudice." '47 In the words of one
federal district court:
In our society we too often form opinions of people on the basis of
skin color, religion, national origin .... and other superficial
features. That tendency to stereotype people is at the root of some
of the social ills that afflict the country, and in adopting the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to attack these stereotyped
characterizations so that people would be judged by their intrinsic
worth.'
State antidiscrimination statutes are typically interpreted in a similar
manner. Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court has observed that
[c]ivil rights acts seek to prevent discrimination against a person
because of stereotyped impressions about the characteristics of a
class to which the person belongs. The Michigan civil rights act is
aimed at "the prejudices and biases" borne against persons because
of their membership in a certain class ... and seeks to eliminate the
44. Id. at 440-41 (citation omitted).
45. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 78 Star. 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)).
46. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (Brennan, J.. plurality opinion).
Hence, Title Vli's proscription of discrimination based upon sex has been taken to mean that
employers are forbidden from taking "gender into account in making employment decisions ....
[G]ender must be irrelevant to employment decisions." Id. at 239-40.
47. Lam v. University of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1563 (9th Cir. 1994).
48. Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
[Vol. 88:1I
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effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices or
biases."
The Michigan Court of Appeals has noted that "[c]ivil rights legislation
has traditionally been enacted to enable individuals to have access to
opportunity based upon individual merit and qualifications and to prohibit
decisions based upon irrelevant characteristics." ''
Taken as a whole, American antidiscrimination law thus follows a
simple but powerful logic. In the context of race-based discrimination, Paul
Brest has authoritatively summarized this logic as an "antidiscrimination
principle" that "lies at the core of most state and federal civil rights
legislation," and that "disfavor[s] classifications and other decisions and
practices that depend on the race... of the parties affected.' l As a result,
American antidiscrimination law typically requires employers, except in
exceptional and discrete circumstances such as affirmative action ,52 to
make decisions as if their employees did not exhibit forbidden characteris-
tics, as if, for example, employees had no race or sex. This is what under-
writes the important trope of 'blindness" that "has played a dominant role
in the interpretation of antidiscrimination prohibitions." 3 Blindness renders
forbidden characteristics invisible; it requires employers to base their
judgments instead upon the deeper and more fundamental ground of
"individual merit" or "intrinsic worth."
In essence, the logic of American antidiscrimination law requires
employers to regard their employees as though they did not display
49. Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 362 N.W.2d 650,653-54(1984) (citation omitted).
50. Micu v. City of Warren, 382 N.W.2d 823,827 (1985).
51. Brest, supra note 41, at I. Brest writes: "The antidiscrimination principle fills a special need
because... race-dependent decisions that are rational and purport to be based solely on legitimate
considerations are likely in fact to rest on assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups or on
the related phenomenon of racially selective sympathy and indifference." Id. at 7.
52. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Another important
exception to this generalization is the line of Title VII analysis known as "disparate impact." Following
this analysis, a plaintiff need only show that a facially neutral employment practice has a
disproportionately adverse impact on a protected class.
Once that threshold is reached, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job-related and justifiable as a matter of business
necessity. Finally, the plaintiff has an opportunity to prove that there exists an alternative
practice that would serve the employer's objectives equally well but have a less severe
adverse effect.
Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking,
104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2019 (1995). Disparate impact analysis does not require any showing that
employer decisions are "based upon" a forbidden category, or have any discriminatory intent, and it
may in fact require employers to take forbidden categories into account so as to ensure neutrality of
impact.
53. Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235,235 (1971). For
a good discussion of the trope of blindness in representations of justice, see Martin Jay, Must Justice Be
Blind? The Challenge of Images to the Law, in LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND
THE AESTHETICS OF LAW 19-35 (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds.. 1999). Jay associates the
blindness of justice with the abstraction of "the exchange principle." Id. at 29.
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socially powerful and salient attributes, because these attributes may
induce irrational and prejudiced judgments. Each time the law adds another
proscribed category of discrimination, it renders yet another attribute of
employees invisible to their employers. In recent years, the list of such pro-
scribed categories has greatly expanded. The Santa Cruz ordinance, for
example, prohibits "arbitrary discrimination" based upon "age, race, color,
creed, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, marital status, sex,
gender, sexual orientation, height, weight or physical characteristic."54
The Santa Cruz ordinance demands that employers interact with their
employees in ways that are blind to almost everything that is normally sali-
ent in everyday social life. It is not clear, however, what such blindness
actually entails. We can conceive what it would mean to treat someone in a
way that renders his race irrelevant; we think we know (although I have
my doubts) what it would mean to treat someone in a way that renders her
sex irrelevant; but I suspect that we have almost no idea what it would
mean physically to encounter a person and nevertheless to treat him in a
way that renders irrelevant his face, voice, body, and gestures.55 In what
sense does a person without an appearance remain a person?
From this perspective, ordinances precluding discrimination based
upon appearance are unsettling because they seem to preclude any ordinary
form of human interaction. So much has been abstracted away from the
employee that, with respect to the employer, the employee is transported
into something like what John Rawls has called an "original position"
behind a "veil of ignorance."56 For reasons that are analogous to antidis-
crimination law, Rawls employs the veil of ignorance to strip away
all "accidents of natural endowment and.., contingencies of social
circumstance"" so as to remove what "sets men at odds and allows them to
be guided by their prejudices."58
The original position is for Rawls primarily a heuristic device to force
us to focus on the "equality between human beings as moral persons," 9
which is to say, "as rational beings with their own ends."6" Sometimes it is
said that antidiscrimination law effaces forbidden attributes for an analo-
gous reason, which is to force employers to recognize the "intrinsic worth"
54. SANTA CRUZ, CAL.. MUN. CODE §§ 9.83.01 (1992).
55. We are, however, learning something of the deep puzzles caused by encountering bodiless
persons in the virtual space of the internet. For a fascinating study, see SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE
SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET (1995).
56. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).
57. Id. at 15.
58. Id. at 19. Behind the veil of ignorance, "no one knows his place in society, his class position
or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence and strength. and the like." Id. at 137.
59. Id. at 19.
60. Id. at 12.
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of employees." But the difficulty with this account is that employers must
make distinctions between employees, and "intrinsic worth" is by hypothe-
sis equal. So American antidiscrimination law must strip away prejudicial
contingencies of social circumstance for a different reason.
In fact what antidiscrimination law seeks to uncover is an apprehen-
sion of "individual merit.62 That is why the author of the Santa Cruz ordi-
nance understood it as forcing employers to judge employees "on the basis
of real criteria," which "is their ability to perform the job." 3 American
antidiscrimination law pushes employers toward functional justifications
for their actions. In the area of Title VII law known as disparate treatment,
for example, employers' reasons for particular decisions disadvantaging
employees are scrutinized to determine whether they are a "pretext for the
sort of discrimination prohibited" by the statute.64 In such circumstances,
employers have strong incentives to articulate 'legitimate reasons" for
their decisions, and these reasons are characteristically connected to the
achievement of a proper "business goal."'65
In the area of Title VII law known as disparate impact, in which
facially neutral selection procedures that have disproportionally adverse
impacts on protected groups are assessed for bias, the law permits employ-
ers to defend procedures by demonstrating that they "are demonstrably a
reasonable measure of job performance."
Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred
over the better qualified simply because of minority origins. Far
from disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made
such qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion,
nationality, and sex become irrelevant. What Congress has
61. See, e.g., supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also Gay Rights Coalition of
Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 37 (D.C. 1987); Brest, supra note 41, at
8. Sometimes the cases express this idea through the notion of "inherent dignity." See, e.g., Sargoy v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1039, 1045 (1992); Starkman v. Mann Theatres Corp., 227 Cal.
App. 3d 1491, 1500 (1991); Nelson v. Miwa, 546 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Haw. 1976). For a good statement
of this theme in Canadian antidiscrimination law, see the remarkable case of Vriend v. Alberta, No.
25285, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 19, at *26 (Can. Sup. Ct. Apr. 2. 1998).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 247 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.,
joint opinion); Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1234 (3d Cir. 1994); Martini v.
Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 977 F. Supp. 464,479 (D.D.C. 1997); supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
63. See supra note 20.
64. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
65. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). Of course, as a matter of technical
law, "Title VII does not make unexplained differences in treatment per se illegal nor does it make
inconsistent or irrational employment practices illegal. It prohibits only intentional discrimination
based upon an employee's protected class characteristics." EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1319
(10th Cir. 1992). 1 mean to imply only that Title VII pushes very hard in the direction of forcing
employers to explain their decisions in light of rational business considerations, as these will prove to
be the most plausible and convincing defenses to charges of discriminatory animus.
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commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the
job and not the person in the abstract. 66
In the area of Title VII law known as "bona fide occupational
qualification" ("BFOQ"), in which certain forms of overt discrimination
based upon sex or national origin can be justified, the Court has held that
the test is whether the proposed BFOQ relates "to the 'essence' . . or to
the 'central mission of the employer's business."'67 Within the area of fed-
eral constitutional law, state classifications based upon race are acceptable
only if they are "justified by a compelling governmental interest
and... 'necessary to the accomplishment' of their legitimate purpose."68
Functional rationality, whether assessed by stricter or more deferential
tests, is thus broadly regarded by American antidiscrimination law as a
justification for employer decisions. The longer the list of attributes
excluded by antidiscrimination law from employer consideration, the more
perfectly the law pushes employers toward considerations of pure instru-
mental reason. From this perspective, employees can come to be seen
merely as means for accomplishing the managerial purposes of an
employer's business.69 For this reason, John Schaar has criticized the
equality of opportunity celebrated by antidiscrimination laws as resting on
a conception of the person that reduces her "to a bundle of abilities, an
instrument valued according to its capacity for performing socially valued
functions with more or less efficiency. 70
The image that most perfectly captures this thrust of antidiscrimina-
tion laws is that of the orchestra audition. Since the 1970s American
orchestras have, in order to overcome ingrained sex discrimination, audi-
tioned musicians by requiring them to play behind opaque screens. Some-
times orchestras use rugs "to muffle the sound of footsteps that could
betray the sex of the candidate," or sometimes a "personnel manager may
ask a woman to take off her shoes and he provides the 'compensating
footsteps."'' 71 In this way, the race, color, religion, sex, national origin, and
66. Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424,436 (1971).
67. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v.
Johnson Controls, Inc, 499 U.S. 187, 203 (1991) [hereinafter "Automobile Workers v, Johnson
Controls, Inc."] (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977), and Western Airlines v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,413 (1985)).
68. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 (1964)).
69. It is interesting to note in this regard that Rawls explicitly argues that "the concept of
rationality" appropriate to the original position "must be interpreted as far as possible in the narrow
sense, standard in economic theory, of taking the most effective means to given ends." RAWLS, supra
note 56, at 14.
70. JOHN H. SCHAAR, Equality of Opportunity and Beyond, in LEGITIMACY IN THE MODERN
STATE 193,203 (1981).
71. CLAUDIA GOLDIN & CECILIA ROUSE, ORCHESTRATING IMPARTIALITY: THE IMPACT OF
"BLIND" AUDITIONS ON FEMALE MUSICIANS 8 & n.19 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working
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appearance of the musician is completely masked behind a veil of igno-
rance, so that employment decisions are made almost entirely 2 on the basis
of the pure production of sound. The musician becomes a perfectly disem-
bodied instrument.
The image of the orchestra audition distills the logic of American
antidiscrimination law. Four aspects of that logic require emphasis. First, it
is no small irony that American antidiscrimination law, which springs from
the noble liberal impulse to protect persons from the indignities of prejudi-
cial mistreatment, should in the end unfold itself according to a logic that
points unmistakably toward the instrumentalization of persons. If liberal-
ism seeks to attribute equal dignity to all persons on the basis of a presocial
and "universal human potential,"'73 American antidiscrimination law, in the
context of employment, strangely imagines itself as transmuting persons at
the very moment of their social manifestation into the object of Weberian
rationalization.
Second, the audition screen is understood to counteract sex discrimi-
nation because it is assumed that musicianship is not intrinsically con-
nected to gender. We use the screen because we believe that how persons
make music does not depend upon their sex; some women and some men
are good musicians, and some are not. The screen permits us to focus on
the pure trait of musicianship, without the distraction of gender. In Europe,
where "blind auditions are still anathema:' this assumption is disputed; it is
claimed "that women change an orchestra's 'morale' and its 'sound.'
74
Our own use of the screen thus reflects a particular historical understand-
ing of the relationship between job performance and gender. We tend to
presume that instrumental action is, in Habermas's phrase, "context-free," 75
so that successful job performance is conceptualized within antidiscrimi-
nation law as logically and practically distinct from potentially stigmatiz-
ing characteristics, like sex or race. These characteristics are figured as
superficial and as fundamentally disconnected from achievement; social
arrangements that are instrumentally rational are concomitantly seen as
non-discriminatory.76
Paper No. 5903, 1997); see also American Orchestras: All Ears, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 1996, at
89.
72. The screen is typically removed "in the final round:' so that the conductor can observe "bad
playing habits." See American Orchestras: All Ears, supra note 71, at 90.
73. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in CHARLES TAYLOR ET AL.,
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
74. American Orchestras: All Ears, supra note 71, at 90. Before simply discounting European
sensibilities in this matter, we should recall the "perennial question" in the United States of whether the
race of a jazz musician affects the quality of his music. See, e.g., Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
"Authenticity" or the Lesson of Little Tree, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REv., Nov. 24, 1991, at 1.
75. JURGEN HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY: STUDENT PROTEST, SCIENCE, AND
POLITICS 93 (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 1970).
76. The tendency of instrumental rationality to cut across and efface the social field is evident in
disparate impact analysis under Title VII. Although disparate impact analysis does not participate in the
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Third, the logic of invisibility exemplified by the audition screen can
have powerful and constructive consequences. Use of the audition screen
vastly increased the number of female musicians in American orchestras."
Antidiscrimination law understands itself as transformative, as fundamen-
tally altering existing social arrangements.78 But this project requires us
imaginatively to project ourselves into alternative social circumstances.
Blindness, whether enforced by a screen or by the law, can be useful and
effective in this regard.
Fourth, the audition screen itself is an essentially artificial device,
serviceable only in discrete, bounded, and exceptional circumstances. It
cannot be generalized. Once hired, a musician must step from behind the
screen, disclose her body and her gender, and live her professional life in
the full glare of social visibility. At that point, her protection from preju-
dice in the conditions of her employment will lie in the logic of willful
blindness legally imposed by antidiscrimination law.
III
The law, of course, is a practical, ramshackle institution, full of com-
promise and contradiction. It nowhere expresses as purely as I have just
done the logic of fairness and equal opportunity. Yet I strongly suspect that
if one were to ask those who participate in the development and application
of antidiscrimination law to explain the thrust of their enterprise, some-
thing very close to the story I have sketched will emerge, whether the
interlocutor is a local councilperson drafting a town ordinance or a federal
judge interpreting constitutive statutes like Title VII.
In the remainder of this Lecture, I shall argue that this story, which I
call the dominant conception of American antidiscrimination law, distorts
and masks the actual operation of that law, and by so doing, potentially
undermines the law's coherence and usefulness as a tool of transformative
social policy.
To see why this is so, we need to remind ourselves that in everyday
life persons mostly inhabit neither the abstractions of an original position
nor the "context-free" objectification of perfect functionality. They live
instead in a social world that springs from history and that creates identities
trope of blindness that characterizes so much of American antidiscrimination law, it nevertheless
clearly holds that employment practices that can be instrumentally justified do not constitute
discrimination, whatever the social impact of these practices on minorities or women. For a discussion,
see supra notes 52 and 66 and infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
77. See GOLDIN & RousE, supra note 71, at 23. In Detroit, however, controversy arose about the
use of the screen because the Detroit Symphony Orchestra "felt constrained in its efforts to include
more African American musicians." Sex Discrmination: Economists Find Switch to Blind Auditions
Boosted Women's Ranks in Major Orchestras, DAILY LAB. REP., July 15, 1997, at A-2.
78. On the transformative thrust of antidiscrimination law, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN,
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 4-10 (1996).
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founded upon contingent facts of socialization and culture.79 American
antidiscrimination law singles out for special scrutiny specific categories
like race, gender, or appearance precisely because in our world these cate-
gories are socially salient and meaningful. We treat people differently
depending upon whether they are men or women, black or white, beautiful
or ugly. We do so because we have been socialized into a culture in which
these differences matter, and matter in systematic ways. We might for the
moment think of these systematic differences as social practices or norms
within which categories like race, gender, and beauty acquire their signifi-
cance.
80
The law is itself a social institution. It does not spring autochtho-
nously from an "original position" or from the discipline of instrumental
reason. Law is made by the very persons who participate in the social
practices that constitute race, gender, and beauty. It would be astonishing,
therefore, if American antidiscrimination law could transcend these catego-
ries, if it could operate in a way that rendered them truly irrelevant." Yet
that is exactly what the dominant conception asks us to believe.
A much more plausible picture is that antidiscrimination law is itself a
social practice, which regulates other social practices, because the latter
have become for one reason or another controversial. It is because the
meaning of categories like race, gender, and beauty have become contested
that we seek to use antidiscrimination law to reshape them in ways that
reflect the purposes of the law. We might summarize this perspective by
observing that antidiscrimination law always begins and ends in history,
which means that it must participate in the very practices that it seeks to
alter and to regulate. 2
In the next Part of my Lecture, I would like to illustrate this conclu-
sion by discussing the example of Title VII's prohibition against discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex. I choose this example because the subject is
especially rich and because gender conventions often turn so crucially on
matters of appearance. 3 In the fifth and penultimate Part of my Lecture, I
will say a few words about the practical implications of thinking about
antidiscrimination law in this way, as distinct from the logic of the domi-
nant conception.
79. For a discussion of the relationship between identity and contingent facts of socialization and
social structure, see ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 3-15, 51-67 (1995).
80. For an unforgettable historical description of the nature of the "structure" of such practices,
see DON HERzOG, POISONING THE MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 244-323, 326-27 (1998).
81. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the
Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1588, 1591 (1997).
82. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111 (1997).
83. On the question of gender and appearance, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE
DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 15-16 (1997).
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IV
Title VII forbids employment decisions that "discriminate against any
individual ... because of such individual's ... sex," ' and it also "prohibits
sex-based classifications in terms and conditions of employment... that
adversely affect an employee's status." 5 This language is quite sweeping,
and it is often said that the object of Title VII is "to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from
sex stereotypes."86 This is interpreted to include "both real and fictional
differences between women and men."87 Thus, for purposes of Title VII,
"[e]ven a true generalization about" sex differences "is an insufficient
reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not
apply. 88
"Generalizations" and "stereotypes" of this kind are, of course, the
conventions that underwrite the social practice of gender. To eliminate all
such generalizations and stereotypes would be to eliminate the practice.
This ambition reflects the goal of the dominant conception, which is to dis-
establish the category of sex and to replace it with the imperatives of func-
tional rationality. 9 Title VII recognizes these imperatives by providing that
an employer may "discriminate on the basis' ° of sex only "in those certain
instances where ... sex... is a bona fide occupational qualification
["BFOQ"] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise."'"
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1998).
85. Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197 (1991). The statute reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
86. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981) (quoting City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)). "The Court has ... held that employment action
governed by gender stereotypes violates Title VII." Note, The Supreme Court: Leading Cases, 112
HARV. L. REV. 122. 333 (1998).
87. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707.
88. Id. at 708.
89. Title VII has been interpreted "to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment
decisions." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,240 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
When an employer ignored the attributes enumerated in the statute. Congress hoped, it
naturally would focus on the qualifications of the applicant or employee. The intent to drive
employers to focus on qualifications rather than on race, religion, sex, or national origin is the
theme of a good deal of the statute's legislative history.
Id. at 243.
90. Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). The statute reads:
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It was quickly recognized that the BFOQ exception had to be
"interpreted narrowly"9 2 or the transformative thrust of Title VII would be
entirely blunted. This was accomplished by rejecting BFOQ exemptions in
cases where the functional requirements of a job demanded capacities that
could be conceptualized as only contingently related to sex, which is to say
as statistically distributed between the sexes. The paradigmatic example is
the refusal to grant a BFOQ exemption to an employer who claims that
women should not be hired for particular positions because "the arduous
nature of the work-related activity renders women physically unsuited for
the jobs."93 Because strength can be seen to be statistically distributed
between the sexes, so that some women and some men have strength, and
some do not, courts hold that such a classification by sex constitutes
unlawful discrimination. They explain that the purpose of Title VII is "to
eliminate subjective assumptions and traditional stereotyped conceptions
regarding the physical ability of women to do particular work"; it is there-
fore a violation of Title VII "if a male employee may be appointed to a
particular position on a showing that he is physically qualified, but a
female employee is denied an opportunity to demonstrate personal physical
qualification."94
This perspective marks a significant alteration of traditional gender
roles. It essentially severs the connection between certain kinds of capaci-
ties and sex, and it constructs a special kind of legal subject, which is the
bearer of these capacities and as to which sex is irrelevantf 5 This legal
subject is the "individual," who is seen as the beneficiary of the equal
opportunity promised by Title VII. 'The statute's focus on the individual is
unambiguous. It precludes treatment of individuals as simply components
of a racial, religious, sexual or national class."96 EEOC regulations provide
that "[t]he principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (I) it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees... on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise.
92. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1998).
93. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 1971). The court offered as an
example of a legal BFOQ the hiring of a woman "for the position of a wet-nurse." Id. at 1224.
94. Id. at 1225. EEOC regulations provide that a BFOQ exception should not be granted where
"[the refusal to hire an individual' is "based on stereotyped characterizations of the sexes. Such
stereotypes include, for example, that men are less capable of assembling intricate equipment; that
women are less capable of aggressive salesmanship." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1998).
95. "Title VII's traditional focus has been to prohibit employer policies and practices that treat
workers differently based on gender-based expectations of who men and women are supposed to be."
Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1738 (1998).
96. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Powerv. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
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considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any
characteristics generally attributed to the group. 97
Under the influence of the dominant conception, courts have inter-
preted the statutory focus on "individuals" as requiring the creation of legal
subjects whose capacities bypass gender conventions and attach directly to
the "context-free" logic of instrumental reason. Judicial rhetoric envisions
"individuals" who exist entirely outside of the historical contingencies of
received gender norms. In actual life, however, persons always inhabit
historical contingency; they neither originate behind a veil of ignorance,
nor do they subsist within the asocial environment of a "context-free"
functional rationality. Because of the particular facts of our history, we do
not encounter in everyday interactions sexless "individuals," but rather
men and women. Sex is thus pervasively important in our understanding of
the capacities of persons. This is as true for those who make and apply the
law as it is for those whom the law seeks to regulate. Like all legal inter-
ventions, Title VII is firmly embedded within this historical context.
It is therefore implausible to read Title VII as mandating that gender
conventions be obliterated. It makes far more sense to interpret the statute
as seeking to alter the particular meanings of these conventions as they are
displayed in specific contexts. On this account, Title VII would in the
context of employment require us to sever the connection between gender
and some capacities, such as strength, but not to eliminate gender as such.
In contrast to the dominant conception, this way of conceptualizing the
statute would not require us to imagine a world of sexless individuals, but
would instead challenge us to explore the precise ways in which Title VII
should alter the norms by which sex is given social meaning. The differ-
ence between the two perspectives can be made visible by examining how
Title VII deals with the question of customer preferences.
It might be said that the essential purpose of any business is to satisfy
its customers and thereby to make a profit. But if customers participate in
the same gender practices that Title VII seeks to modify, business deci-
sions seeking to gratify customers will undermine the transformative thrust
of Title VII. So, for example, soon after the enactment of the statute an
armored car company sought to obtain a BFOQ exception for its policy of
refusing to hire women courier guards on the grounds that "many of its
customers would deny it business if [it] used women guards, since the
customers would feel that women could not provide the degree of security
needed." 98 The company's request evoked the ideal of functional rational-
ity, because it argued that a BFOQ was necessary to maximize profits. Yet
the request was controversial because it revealed a potentially disturbing
tension between the ideal of gender-blindness and functional rationality. It
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (1998).
98. EEOC Dec. No. 70-11, EEOC Decs. (CCH) 602-5 (July 8, 1969).
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indicated that in a world of historically given gender conventions, func-
tional rationality may in some circumstances actually reinforce traditional
gender understandings.
We might better grasp the deep implications of the armored car com-
pany's request by returning to our image of the orchestra audition. The
company's request suggests that the image may mislead us because it too
quickly conflates the sex blindness created by a veil of ignorance with a
purified form of instrumental rationality. The whole point of the audition
screen, after all, is to remove potential prejudice that might interfere with a
more accurate appreciation of the quality of a musician's performance. But
if that quality were actually dependent upon a musician's sex, if men in
fact made better music because of their sex, then the screen would no
longer serve this function. We would thus be put to a choice. Either we
could continue to seek the best orchestra possible, fully knowing that this
pursuit would incorporate sex-related traits, or we could sacrifice the qual-
ity of our orchestra in order to pursue a norm of sex equality.'
In effect, the request of the armored car company was for the EEOC
to adopt the first option. But notice that under either option the audition
screen would be rendered superfluous. Under the first option, hiring the
best possible orchestra would require knowing the sex of musicians, so that
the ideal of sex blindness would be trumped by the imperatives of instru-
mental rationality. Under the second option, the goal of hiring specific
numbers of female and male musicians would trump the ideal of sex blind-
ness in the name of sex equality. In either case, the screen would have
ceased to serve a useful function.
This illustrates the profound way in which both the ideal of sex blind-
ness and the dominant conception presuppose a certain relationship
between potentially stigmatizing characteristics like sex (or race) and in-
strumental rationality. Sex blindness does not make sense unless these
characteristics are understood to be fundamentally disconnected from
functional rationality. The coherence of the dominant conception requires
us to conceptualize the trait of musicianship as statistically distributed
between the sexes, like the trait of physical strength.
Not surprisingly, the EEOC firmly rejected the exception requested by
the armored car company. The Commission stated that the business had
provided "no factual evidence, based on experience or otherwise, that
would support its assertion that all or nearly all females are unfit for the
position of Courier Guard. ''x°n The armored car company, however, had
never argued that women could not perform the function of a courier
guard; it had instead contended that maximizing its profits required
99. This latter option is essentially the holding of City of Los Angeles Dep 't of Water & Powerv.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
100. EEOC Decision No. 70-11, supra note 98, at 4048.
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pandering to the expectations of its customers. By focusing the question of
functional rationality on the narrow issue of the job performance of courier
guards, instead of on the larger issue of the success of the business, the
EEOC essentially insisted that the norm of sex blindness remain firmly
attached to a concept of functional rationality.
An obvious difficulty with the EEOC's proposed focus is that the
constituent tasks of a business are significant only if the business is itself
successful, so that the instrumental logic required for the maintenance of
an armored car company would seem to take analytic and practical prece-
dence over that required for the successful performance of the job of a cou-
rier guard. Regardless of whether one accepts this point, however, it is
clear that the Commission's decision renders instrumental rationality a
malleable category, to be manipulated for the purpose of sustaining a cor-
respondence between the norm of sex blindness and functional rationality.
The effect of this correspondence is to foreclose inquiry into the justifica-
tion, and therefore into the reach and significance, of the law's pursuit of
the ideal of sex blindness.
Once functional rationality and sex blindness are analytically sepa-
rated, however, this inquiry cannot be evaded. The Commission's decision
has come to stand for the black-letter rule that Title VII will not permit an
appeal to customer preferences to render "nugatory the will of Congress"''
that capacities conceptualized as statistically distributed between the sexes
be determined on an individualized basis.0 " The question, therefore, is
which capacities are to be conceptualized by the law as "sexless" in this
way. If we cannot use the logic of instrumental rationality as a guide, by
what alternative rationale are such capacities to be identified?
Because the dominant conception seeks completely to suppress gen-
der stereotypes and generalizations, it would suggest that all capacities be
conceptualized as statistically distributed between the sexes. It would thus
deny the legitimacy of all customer preferences that incorporate traditional
gender conventions. Contemporary EEOC regulations essentially take this
101. Id. The EEOC stated that the company's request "is, in law, without merit, since it presumes
that customers' desires may be accommodated even at the price of rendering nugatory the will of
Congress." Id. This response is especially striking given that the EEOC could have argued, as John
Hart Ely has pointed out to me, that if all armored car companies were forced to hire female guards, no
particular company would be placed at a competitive disadvantage. Evidently, the EEOC was unwilling
to contemplate even the possibility of a theoretical divergence between sex blindness and functional
rationality.
102. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971):
While we recognize that the public's expectation of finding one sex in a particular role may
cause some initial difficulty, it would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the
preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was
valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome.
Thus, we feel that customer preference may be taken into account only when it is based on
the company's inability to perform the primary function or service it offers.
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position, 3 which is echoed by judicial pronouncements to the effect that
"stereotypic impressions of male and female roles do not qualify gender as
a BFOQ.' Yet if judicial decisions are carefully parsed, it can be seen
that such pronouncements, which express the perspective of the dominant
conception, do not correspond to the actual shape of the law.
Consider, in this context, the case of Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 5
in which Southwest Airlines sought to defend its policy of hiring only
"attractive female flight attendants" as a BFOQ because its "sexy image"
was "crucial to the airline's continued financial success.""' It is (at pres-
ent) difficult to imagine a world in which sexual attraction would be
regarded as a capacity borne by individuals as to whom sex is irrelevant.
Put another way, sexual attraction is so firmly attached to existing gender
roles that the effort to transform such roles by dislodging the "stereotypes"
presently manifested by sexual attraction seems an implausible ambition
for the law.
Certainly the court in Wilson was not about to interpret Title VII as
disestablishing such fundamental gender practices. The court cleverly
solved this problem by differentiating businesses whose primary purpose is
to sell sexual attraction, such as Playboy Clubs, 7 from businesses such as
Southwest Airlines, where the purpose of the business does not involve
sexual gratification. The court conceded that where "sex appeal is itself the
dominant service provided. .. customer preference for one sex
only ... would logically be so strong that the employer's ability to perform
the primary function or service offered would be undermined by not hiring
members of the authentic sex or group exclusively.""'8 In these circum-
stances, sex would constitute a BFOQ.
103. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1998):
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the application of
the bona fide occupational qualification exception:
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of... customers except as
covered specifically in paragraph (a)(2) of this section.
(2) Where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, the Commission will
consider sex to be a bona fide occupational qualificatioi, e.g., an actor or actress.
104. Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981); see alsoSprogis v. United
Air Lines, 444 F.2d. 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1971).
105. 517 F. Supp 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
106. Id. at 293. Southwest was known as the "love airline." Id. at 294.
Unabashed allusions to love and sex pervade all aspects of Southwest's public image. Its
T.V. commercials feature attractive attendants in fitted outfits, catering to male passengers
while an alluring feminine voice promises in-flight love. On board, attendants in hot-pants
(skirts are now optional) serve "love bites" (toasted almonds) and "love potions" (cocktails).
Id. at n.4. "[S]ex appeal has been used to attract male customers to the airline.... The evidence was
undisputed that Southwest's unique, feminized image played and continues to play an important role in
the airline's success." Id. at 295.
107. See id. at 301.
108. Id.
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But the court distinguished such businesses from Southwest Airlines,
whose "primary function is to transport passengers safely and quickly from
one point to another," rather than to sell "vicarious sex entertainment.""'
Having defined the purpose of Southwest Airlines in this way, the court
could easily conclude that the capacities necessary to ensure safe and effi-
cient transportation could properly be attached to individuals as to whom
sex is irrelevant. In effect, the court transformed the question into a simple
variant of the courier guard case.
The court in Wilson recognized that Title VII did not seek to alter
certain gender conventions. It was unwilling to imagine a world in which
sexual attraction was statistically distributed among "individuals," so that
men and women would be attracted to persons regardless of their sex. But
the court was nevertheless willing to intervene to shape existing practices
within the airline industry. By exercising the authority to manipulate the
definition of the "primary function" of the industry, the court held that
sexual attraction was not a relevant capacity of flight attendants. Although
this represents an important legal modification of a large industry, the court
also implicitly acknowledged the limits of the law's efforts to effect such
transformations.
The nature of these limits can be seen by contrasting Wilson with a
case such as Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.," in which a female TV news
anchor alleged that different standards of "appearance" were imposed upon
her than upon her male counterparts. The court accepted as a fact that
KMBC, the employer television station, "required both male and female
on-air personnel to maintain professional, businesslike appearances,
'consistent with community standards,' and that the station enforced that
requirement in an evenhanded, nondiscriminatory manner.' The court
also recognized, however, that KMBC imposed fashion requirements that
were gender-specific, so that the plaintiff was instructed to "purchase more
blouses with 'feminine touches,' such as bows and ruffles, because
many of her clothes were 'too masculine.""' 2 The court chose to accept
these requirements on the grounds that they were "'obviously critical'
to KMBC's economic well-being," given the "conservatism thought
necessary in the Kansas City market."" 3 In contrast to Wilson, the court in
Craft refused to redefine the nature of the job qualifications at issue by
recharacterizing the purposes of the business:
While we believe the record shows an overemphasis by
KMBC on appearance, we are not the proper forum in which to
109. Id. at 302.
I 10. 766 F.2d 1205, 1207 (8th Cir. 1985).
Ill. Id. at 1209-10.
112. ld. at 1214.
113. Id. at 1215.
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debate the relationship between newsgathering and dissemination
and considerations of appearance and presentation-i.e., questions
of substance versus image-in television journalism." 4
In Craft, therefore, the court declined to distinguish between the
requirements of disseminating the news and the requirements of generating
an audience. It consequently accepted the gender conventions implicit in
customer preferences as a justification for gender-specific appearance
regulations,I 5 thereby sheltering these conventions from the transformative
force of Title VII."' KMBC was authorized by the court to treat its news
anchor as a woman, rather than as an individual for whom sex is irrele-
vant."7 The distinction between Wilson and Craft thus marks a line in the
social geography of the law's willingness to disturb existing gender roles.
The demarcations of this social geography are complex and respon-
sive to many factors. Distinctions in social understandings of specific
industries and enterprises are relevant; the airline industry is not equivalent
to the television business. The impact of gender conventions on employ-
ment opportunities is also pertinent. Wilson is a case about sex-specific
hiring practices, whereas Craft concerns sex-specific appearance codes
applied to a gender-integrated workforce."' The effect of accepting gender
conventions is therefore different in the two cases. Also relevant, however,
is a court's independent assessment of the value of the conventions poten-
tially displaced by Title VII.
One can see this clearly in a case like Fesel v. Masonic Home of
Delaware, Inc., 9 which involved a residential retirement home that
refused to hire male nurse's aides. The responsibilities of the aides
included the provision of "intimate personal care, including dressing,
bathing, toilet assistance, geriatric pad changes and catheter care."'2
Twenty-two of the home's thirty guests were female, 2' and many of these
114. Id.
115. See ALAN HYDE, BoDiEs OF LAw 120 (1997).
116. The radical implications of the District of Columbia statute prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of personal appearance have been contained by judicial interpretations that essentially follow the
logic of Craft. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501, 1-2502(22) (1999). The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals accepts consumer preferences as constituting "a reasonable business purpose" for employer
regulations of appearance. See Turcios v. United States Serv. Indus., 680 A.2d 1023, 1029 (D.C. 1996)
(finding that fear that contracts would be jeopardized was a sufficient reasonable business purpose for a
no-tail hairstyle rule).
117. For a critique of Craft, see Note, Sex Discrimination in Newscasting, 84 MICH. L. REv. 443
(1985). See generally, Note, Title V11 Limits on Discrimination Against Television Anchorwomen on
the Basis ofAge-Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 190 (1985).
118. For a recent decision involving sex-specific hiring practices for TV anchors, see Mike Allen,
Anchorwoman Wins $8.3 Million Over Sex Bias, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 29, 1999, at B1. Apparently, the TV
station in that case insisted on pairing male and female anchors; it had refused to renew the plaintiffs
contract because they had too many female anchors.
119. 447F.Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978).
120. Id. at 1352-53.
121. See id. at 1348.
2000]
HeinOnline -- 88 Cal. L. Rev. 25 2000
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
"would not consent to having their personal needs attended to by ... male
nurse's aides."'' The court accepted the preferences of the home's custom-
ers and held that the "the sex of the nurse's aides at the Home is crucial to
successful job performance."'" The Court did not deny that these prefer-
ences rested upon "sexual stereotyping," but it nevertheless explicitly
accepted these stereotypes as legitimate:
As plaintiff stresses, the attitudes of the nonconsenting female
guests at the Home are undoubtedly attributable to their upbringing
and to sexual stereotyping of the past. While these attitudes may be
characterized as "customer preference," this is, nevertheless, not
the kind of case governed by the regulatory provision that customer
preference alone cannot justify a job qualification based upon sex.
Here personal privacy interests are implicated which are protected
by law and which have to be recognized by the employer in
running its business.2 4
Gender is highly salient in matters of privacy. The sex of the person
by whom we are seen or touched normally matters very much to us. For
this reason, the court in Fesel did not imagine the plaintiff as an individual
whose sex was irrelevant, but instead as a fully sexed person. Even though
the employer in Fesel, like the employer in Wilson, sought to maintain a
single-sex work force, Fesel accepted the gender-specific stereotypes
implicit in the privacy norms invoked by the nursing home, and the court
incorporated these stereotypes into the BFOQ exception of Title VII.'I
Fesel illustrates how Title VII does not simply displace gender prac-
tices, but rather interacts with them in a selective manner. The case forces
us to ask which gender practices are to be reshaped by Title VII, in what
contexts, and in what ways. These are questions that depend upon our
understanding of the exact purposes and ambitions of Title VII. They are
also questions that depend upon our assessment of the capacity of legal
122. Id. at 1352.
123. Id. at 1353.
124. Id. at 1352. The Court's point that the privacy interests of the guests were "protected by law"
is simply makeweight, since the federal requirements of 'ritle VII would preempt any competing
considerations of state law. In Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., for example, the Court responded to the
defendant's contention that "appointing a woman to the position would result in a violation of
California labor laws and regulations which limit hours of work for women and restrict the weight they
are permitted to lift," with the curt observation "that state labor laws inconsistent with the general
objectives of the Act must be disregarded." 444 F.2d 1219, 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1971); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1604.2(b) (1998).
125. On privacy as a BFOQ, see Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,
206 n.4 (1991); EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Il1. 1993); Hernandez v. University of St.
Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1992); Local 567, AFSCME v. Michigan Council 25, 635 F.
Supp. 1010 (E.D. Mich. 1986); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr, 29 FEP Cases 159 (W.D. OkI. 1982). For
critiques, see Elsa M. Shartsis, Privacy as Rationale for the Sex-Based BFOQ, 1985 DET. C.L. REV.
865; Case Comment, Sex Discrimination Justified Under Title VII: Privacy Rights in Nursing Homes,
14 VAL. U. L. REV. 577 (1980).
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institutions to transform social practices. Any such assessment must
depend upon tact and judgment. As one court put it, "The laws outlawing
sex discrimination are important. They are a significant advance. They
must be realistically interpreted, or they will be ignored or displaced. Ours
should not be an effort to achieve a unisex society ....
The many nuances of these inquiries are lost if Title VII is imagined
simply as striking "at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes."'27 This ambition is merely obfus-
catory. It effaces, for example, the contrast between Fesel and a decision
such as Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections,'28 in which women
employees of all-male maximum security institutions in Michigan chal-
lenged a policy of prohibiting women from working within residential
units. In Griffin, the court flatly rejected the state's claim that the policy
was necessary to protect the privacy of male inmates. It castigated the pol-
icy as "based on a stereotypical sexual characterization that a viewing of an
inmate while nude or performing bodily functions, by a member of the
opposite sex, is intrinsically more odious than the viewing by a member
of one's own sex."'29 Griffin explained that this was 'Just the type of
stereotypical value system condemned by Title VII. '' 13 "The implicit
mandate of Title VII is that a woman should be evaluated and treated by an
employer on the basis of her individual qualifications and not on the basis
of any assumptions regarding the characteristics and qualifications of
women as a group."''
Griffin reproduces standard Title VII rhetoric and logic. But if we
were to try to explain the different outcomes in Fesel and Griffin, this logic
would seem unhelpful. Instead, we would certainly begin with the fact that
Fesel addressed the privacy rights of nursing home residents, while Griffin
assessed the privacy concerns of convicted criminals in maximum security
institutions. Although gender stereotypes are equally present in both cases,
so that the generic Title VII logic of individualism is equally relevant, the
courts evidently attributed less value to the gendered privacy norms of
prisoners than to those of nursing home residents. This illustrates that as
126. Boyce v. Safeway Stores, 351 F. Supp. 402,404 (D.D.C. 1972).
127. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981) (quoting City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, 444 F.2d 1194,1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
128. 654 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
129. Id. at 701.
130. Id. at 702 (quoting Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952, 956 n.4
(N.D. Iowa 1979)).
131. Id. at 701. As a consequence of the holding and reasoning of Griin, the state of Michigan
subsequently authorized male guards to work in the residential units of female prisoners, and this
policy resulted in charges of serious sexual harassment and abuse. See Human Rights Watch, Nowhere
To Hide: Retaliation Against Women in Michigan State Prisons, 10 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT 2
(Sept. 1998); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, ALL Too FAMILIAR: SEXUAL
ABUSE OF WOMEN IN U.S. STATE PRISONS 242-80 (1996).
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gender norms come to seem more fundamental to a court, it will be corre-
spondingly more reluctant to disturb them. Norms that are fundamental are
those that are significant and uncontroversial when seen from the perspec-
tive of those implementing the law.
A good example of norms that may seem superficially trivial but in
fact are regarded as fundamental are those that involve the presentation of
the self in matters of grooming and dress.' Gender is pervasively consti-
tuted by norms of presentation. It should therefore be no surprise that
courts have generally held "that regulations promulgated by employers
which require male employees to conform to different grooming and dress
standards than female employees [are] not sex discrimination within the
meaning of Title VII.L"33 In the view of most courts, such regulations
no more constitute discrimination "on the basis of sex... than a condition
of employment that requires males and females to use separate toilet
facilities.""L
132. For a general discussion of these cases, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear
Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MtcH.
L. REV. 2541 (1994); Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition of
Discrimination Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 769 (1987); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair
Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 (1991); Karl E.
Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1395 (1992);
Lynne D. Mapes-Riordan, Sex Discrimination and Employer Weight and Appearance Standards, 16
EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 493 (1991); Mary Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in
Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 73 (1982).
133. Fountain v. Safeway Stores, 555 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1977). "[T]he Act was never
intended to interfere in the promulgation and enforcement of personal appearance regulations by
private employers," because Congress could not have intended "for its proscription of sexual
discrimination to have [such] significant and sweeping implications." Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 527
F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (8th Cir. 1975).
134. Boyce v. Safeway Stores, 351 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D.D.C. 1972); see also Dodge v. Giant
Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding distinct hair length requirements for men
and women, and mentioning sex-segregated toilet facilities as clearly outside the reach of Title VII). I
should note that early in the history of Title VII there were a few decisions in which judges did attempt
to use the law to displace gender norms of dress and grooming. For example, in Aros v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972), the court struck down a grooming code that
permitted women, but not men, to have long hair. In an eloquent summary of the dominant view, the
court said:
The issue of long hair on men tends to arouse the passions of many in our society today. In
that regard the issue is no different from issues of race, color, religion, national origin and
equal employment rights for women, all of which are raised in Title VII. When this Nation
was settled it was hoped that there be established a society where every individual would be
judged according to his ability rather than who his father was,... or what the color of his
skin was. Since then, millions of individuals have landed on our shores in search of
opportunity-opportunity which was denied them in their homelands because of rigid class
structures and irrational group stereotypes. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was born of that
hope. Although the legal technicalities are many, the message of the Act is clear: every
person is to be treated as an individual, with respect and dignity. Stereotypes based upon
race, color, religion, sex or national origin are to be avoided.
Males with long hair conjure up exactly the sort of stereotyped responses Congress
intended to be discarded.... Some employers argue that their professional image and
reputation may suffer from hiring men who prefer to wear their hair in longer styles. Title VII
[Vol. 88:1]
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The striking authority exercised by gendered appearance norms in the
interpretation of Title VII may be seen in a decision like Lanigan v.
Bartlett & Co. Grain.35 In that case the plaintiff attacked an employer's
rule prohibiting women from wearing pants in its executive offices, alleg-
ing that the rule perpetuated "'a sexist, chauvinistic attitude"' which could
not be functionally defended, because the company "'could offer no excuse
whatsoever as to why [a] secretary could perform a job in a more efficient
manner in a skirt rather than a pantsuit."" '36 The court blandly replied to
these stinging allegations that they "miss the point":
An employer is not required to justify any business practice in a
Title VII action until and unless the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case of discrimination. The fact that defendant
introduced no evidence on the "business necessity" of a dress code
prohibiting pantsuits on women working in its executive offices
proves nothing because the Court holds that plaintiff has not
established a prima facie case of discrimination. Accordingly,
defendant was not obligated to defend its dress code policies. 37
Title VII decisions distinguish between grooming and dress codes that
track "generally accepted community standards of dress and appearance"'
3
and those that do not. The former are regarded as enforcing a "neutral"
baseline that negates any inference of sex discrimination . 39 Thus an
employer who requires employees "to be neatly dressed and groomed in
accordance with the standards customarily accepted in the business
community," and hence who excludes "the employing of men (but not
women) with long hair," does not discriminate on the basis of sex in viola-
tion of Title VII.'4
Employer dress codes that violate traditional standards, however, are
regarded as enforcing sex discrimination. Thus the dress code of an
employer who permitted men to wear "customary business attire" but who
required women to wear a "uniform" was regarded as without "justification
in commonly accepted social norms."'' It was consequently rejected as
"demeaning," as embodying the "offensive stereotypes prohibited by Title
VII. ' '42 This conclusion obtains whether or not female employees can
does not permit the employer to indulge in such generalizations. The Act requires that every
individual be judged according to his own conduct and job performance.
Id. at 666; see Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of Am., 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (denying
defendant's motion to dismiss under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in circumstances analogous to those in
Aros).
135. 466 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
136. Id. at 1391.
137. Id.
138. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975).
139. See id. at 1092.
140. Id. at 1087.
141. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979).
142. Id. at 1033.
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demonstrate any other material differences in their treatment (i.e., in their
"salary, benefits, hours of employment, raises, employment evaluations or
any other term or condition of employment").'43
These cases nicely illustrate how customary gender norms are incor-
porated into the very meaning and texture of Title VII. 1" So far from
striking "at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes," 5 the statute in fact negotiates the ways in
which it will shape and alter existing gender norms. So long as gender
conventions remain salient within our culture, Title VII must be under-
stood as marking a frontier between those gender conventions subject to
legal transformation and those left untouched or actually reproduced within
the law. Of course, the frontier is a moving one, for courts are continuously
re-evaluating which stereotypes should be permitted, in what contexts, and
for what reasons. We can be certain, however, that to the extent that gender
remains a culturally inescapable fact, it also will remain inextricably pres-
ent in the application of Title VII.'"
V
It may be useful to recapitulate the argument that I have so far devel-
oped. The dominant conception of American antidiscrimination law aspires
to suppress categories of social judgment that are deemed likely to be
infected with prejudice. This suppression occurs within an imaginative
space that figures a correspondence between presocial individuals, on the
one hand, and "context-free" functional capacities on the other. There is
thus a strong impulse within the dominant perspective to imagine the law
as standing in a neutral space outside of history and of the contingent
social practices of which history is comprised.
Taken to its ultimate conclusion, the utopian quality of this impulse
suggests why TRB was so unsettled by the prospect of prohibiting
143. O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp 263, 265 (S.D. Ohio
1987).
144. The point, of course, may be made about the law more generally. Thus in defending a judge's
policy of requiring male attorneys, but not female attorneys, to wear ties in court, a federal judge
concluded:
At least until that dreadful day when unisex identity of dress and appearance arrives, judicial
officers ... are entitled to some latitude in differentiating between male and female attorneys,
within the context of decorous professional behavior and appearance.... Because
contemporary fashions are different, a judge may permissibly conclude that a male attorney
appearing in court without a necktie is lacking in proper decorum, whereas a female attorney
not wearing a necktie is not subject to that criticism.
Devine v. Lonschein, 621 F. Supp. 894, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
145. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981) (quoting City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
146. For an incisive formulation of this point in the context of legal interventions into matters of
gender generally, see Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning
Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1212-15 (1994).
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discrimination on the basis of personal appearance. Anti-lookism ordi-
nances abstract so severely from everyday social life that it is difficult to
imagine how they could possibly reconstruct any actual social practice. We
might even go so far as to say that the Santa Cruz ordinance would be
inconceivable unless one were, so to speak, in the grip of the dominant
conception.
Because the dominant conception offers an implausible story about
the actual shape of antidiscrimination law, I have proposed an alternative
perspective, which we may call the sociological account, in which antidis-
crimination law is understood as a social practice that acts on other social
practices. According to the sociological account, antidiscrimination law
must be seen as transforming preexisting social practices, such as race or
gender, by reconstructing the social identities of persons.'47 The sociologi-
cal account does not ask whether "stereotypic impressions" can be elimi-
nated tout court, but rather how the law alters and modifies such
impressions.
In contrast to the dominant conception, the sociological account
accepts the inevitability of social practices. But precisely because of this
acceptance, the account requires that principles be articulated that will
guide and direct the transformation of social practices. Because the domi-
nant conception seeks entirely to transcend and eliminate social practices,
it has not fully developed such principles. Instead, it imagines a world in
which the presocial demands of an "original position" exactly coincide
with the imperatives of a "context-free" functional rationality. It therefore
lacks the resources to identify and analyze the many ways in which instru-
mental rationality can itself actually reinforce existing social practices. The
sociological account, by contrast, focuses on how the law reconstructs
social practices, even at the sacrifice of instrumental rationality.
Of course, the practical impact of the sociological account will
depend upon the nature of the specific principles that we seek to implement
through antidiscrimination law.'" The insights that the sociological account
offers concerning the actual operation of antidiscrimination law, however,
ought to be pertinent to the adoption of these principles. In this regard, it is
147. An antidiscrimination law informed by the sociological account would thus not approach the
problem of lookism by attempting to make us blind to appearances, but rather "by directing attention
to" and seeking to alter "oppressive social norms of beauty." Elizabeth S. Anderson. What Is the Point
of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287,335 (1999).
148. Much of the scholarly work on anti-subordination theory can be interpreted as advocating
principles that could guide the application of antidiscrimination law under a sociological approach. See,
e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1003, 1005 (1986); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988). But antisubordination
theory is by no means the only source for such principles. There is a wide range of possibilities. Each
of Barbara Flagg's opposed notions of the "pluralist" and "assimilationist" interpretation of equal
opportunity could, for example, potentially serve this purpose. See Flagg, supra note 52, at 2033-36.
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useful to bear in mind that although the articulation of such principles will
no doubt transpire chiefly through the usual mechanisms of statutory and
constitutional interpretation, larger moral values will no doubt also prove
influential. The sociological account therefore need not prove intrinsically
incompatible with normative reasoning or even to the heuristic device of
the original position. But we can learn from the sociological account that
insofar as we seek to realize the conclusions of normative reasoning in law,
we should do so in a way that recognizes how law functions to embody
itself in history.
In this brief Lecture, I shall not attempt to argue for any particular set
of principles that ought to guide the application of antidiscrimination law.
That is a long and complicated discussion. In my remaining time, I shall
instead explore the question of whether it makes any difference if we sub-
stitute the understanding of the actual operation of antidiscrimination law
contained in the sociological account for that implicit within the dominant
conception, even on the assumption that we have not yet specified any
such principles. The dominant conception, after all, tells a simple and pow-
erful story that has successfully propelled important changes in American
society. Even if it is in some ways incomplete and inaccurate, we never-
theless ought to be careful about abandoning such an effective instrument
of social transformation. Four considerations seem to me especially perti-
nent to assessing the advisability of any such course of action.
First, I think it clear that the insights of the sociological account can
create greater judicial accountability than can the dominant conception.
The sociological account suggests that courts will apply antidiscrimination
law in ways that implicate it in the very practices it seeks to modify. The
dominant conception, however, denies that these practices have any legiti-
mate role in the application of antidiscrimination law. If, in fact, the
sociological account is correct, we can expect judicial opinions to reach
conclusions accepting social practices in implicit and indirect ways. This is
certainly evident in a decision such as Craft,'49 where the dominant con-
ception stripped the court of its ability to acknowledge the legitimacy of
gender norms, and where the court was therefore forced to smuggle its
acceptance of these norms into an instrumental logic that deferred to con-
sumer preferences. By contrast, an approach that accepted the insights of
the sociological account would have invited the court in Craft explicitly to
state and defend the grounds for its conclusions, and this in turn would
have facilitated public review and critique. Such an approach would thus
render decisions such as Craft far more accountable for their actual judg-
ments.
149. 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985); see supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
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In a similar way, the insights of the sociological account would render
more accountable decisions like Wilson'5" or the EEOC judgment in the
courier guard case. 5' Each of these decisions involves contexts in which
functional rationality potentially undermines a norm of gender-blindness.
Yet because the dominant conception lacks the resources to analyze or
acknowledge such a tension, both opinions were led systematically to
manipulate the category of functional rationality so as to disguise its diver-
gence from the norm of gender-blindness. As a result, neither opinion
could offer a frank and helpful discussion of how such contradictions
ought to be resolved. Because the sociological account finds no particular
discomfort in recognizing that the project of transforming gender conven-
tions may sometimes require the sacrifice of instrumental rationality, it
would invite a more candid appraisal of the trade-offs implicit in such
situations. Accountability would thereby be increased.
Second, the insights of the sociological account would for this reason
encourage greater doctrinal coherence. It is potentially damaging to the
doctrinal structure of the law when judges cannot explain the actual justifi-
cations for their decisions.'52 The point is well illustrated by the Title VII
cases involving gender-specific grooming codes. Such codes clearly regu-
late persons who have socially endowed gender-identities, rather than
"individuals" for whom sex is irrelevant. They are for this reason anoma-
lous within the framework of the dominant conception. Yet American
judges, who tend to be quite practical,'53 have been unwilling to use Title
VII to strike down these codes. Caught between a doctrinal commitment to
the dominant conception and an instinctive apprehension that Title VII
should be understood as modifying (rather than displacing) gender norms,
courts have been unable to offer any coherent doctrinal explanation of their
decisions.
Perhaps the leading case is Willingham v. Macon Telegraph
Publishing Co., in which a newspaper required male but not female
employees to have short hair. Willingham held that the newspaper's
grooming code was an example of "'sex plus' discrimination" because it
was on the basis "of sex plus one other ostensibly neutral characteristic'
(short hair) that the newspaper discriminated against some men, but not all
men.55 The court concluded that "'sex plus' discrimination" was not
150. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
152. I acknowledge, however, that there are sometimes important legal values to be served by
judicial indirection, by the ability of courts to pursue their ends in implicit and inarticulate ways. See,
e.g., Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 CALIF. L. REV.
491,507 (1994).
153. See, e.g., supra note 126 and accompanying text.
154. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
155. Id. at 1089.
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discrimination on the basis of sex for purpose of Title VII unless the "plus"
factor involved "immutable characteristics" or a "fundamental right" (such
as the right to marry).'56
This doctrine of "sex plus" discrimination is broadly framed and car-
ries a wide range of potential applications. It has been consequential, 157 and
yet it is entirely incoherent. If an employer imposes a grooming code that
requires blacks, but not whites, to have short hair, I strongly suspect that no
court in the country would classify the code as "race plus" and hence
immune from Title VII scrutiny. Willingham justifies the requirement that
the plus factor be either an immutable characteristic or a fundamental right
on the grounds that only such factors are important enough to interfere
with the "[e]qual employment opportunity" that is said to be the essential
purpose of Title VII. sr But this justification is plainly misconceived. If an
employer requires female but not male employees to live within three
miles of a factory, the requirement would affect equal employment oppor-
tunity but involve neither an immutable characteristic nor a fundamental
right. 159
What seems in fact to be driving the outcome in Willingham is the
conviction that employers reasonably may impose sex-based stereotypes in
matters of grooming, so long as these stereotypes conform to traditional
gender conventions. That explains why courts confronting dress codes that
find "no justification in accepted social norms" have struck them down,
even though the codes cause no discernible adverse effects on other equal
employment opportunities.)" But courts never directly address the funda-
mental question of why the gender roles implicit in dress codes reasonably
may be imposed when they reflect conventional standards.
It seems to be important that grooming and dress codes regulate vol-
untary behavior, for courts tend to conceptualize employees who present
themselves in ways that violate established gender grooming and dress
conventions as asserting a "personal preference" to flout accepted
standards. 6 ' Courts therefore read claims for protection by those who
156. Id. at 1091. The court thus distinguished Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.
1971), in which a requirement that female airline stewardesses be unmarried was found to violate Title
viI.
157. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir.
1980); Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); Arnett v.
Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Lanigan v. Bartlett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp 1388.
1391 (W.D. Mo. 1979); cf. Coleman v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199,
1203-04 (10th Cir. 1997); Rogers v. American Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Jarrell
v. Eastern Air Lines, 430 F. Supp. 884, 892 (E.D. Va. 1977).
158. 507 F.2d at 1091.
159. The example is drawn from the dissenting opinion of Judge Winter in Earwood. See 539 F.2d
at 1352 n.2.
160. O'Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 265-66 (S.D. Ohio
1987); see also Carroll v. Talrnan Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979).
161. Earwood, 539 F.2d at 1351.
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deviate from gendered appearance norms as ultimately asserting a right
autonomously to present oneself "in a self-determined manner,"'6 rather
than a right to fair and equal treatment.'63 Just as Santa Cruz employers
bridled at having to accept people who 'look[] and act[] as if they don't
care what others think,"'' M so federal courts have been unwilling to require
employers to ignore what they regard as willful deviations from customary
norms of gender appearance. 65
The dominant conception, however, prevents courts from explicitly
articulating doctrinal rules that express this perspective. This is because the
dominant conception holds that all employer decisions "motivated by
stereotypical notions" about proper gender "deportment" are presumptively
illegal.'66 We are therefore simultaneously confronted by the spectacle of
162. Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
163. This tendency may account for the otherwise mysterious tendency of courts to say that
gendered norms of appearance do not violate Title VII because the statute only prohibits discrimination
based upon "immutable characteristics." Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 897 (9th
Cir. 1974); cf. Bedker v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 62 FEP Cases 1848 (1992). Title VII, of course,
prohibits discrimination based upon religion, which is not immutable. For a discussion, see supra text
at notes 37-41.
164. Adams, supra note 23, at C4 (quoting Businessman Nole Smith).
165. As the court said in Fagan, 481 F.2d at 1124-25,
Perhaps no facet of business life is more important than a company's place in public
estimation. That the image created by its employees dealing with the public when on
company assignment affects its relations is so well known that we may take judicial notice of
an employer's proper desire to achieve favorable acceptance. Good grooming regulations
reflect a company's policy in our highly competitive business environment. Reasonable
requirements in furtherance of that policy are an aspect of managerial responsibility.
For a defense of employee autonomy in the context of dress and grooming codes, see Klare, supra note
132.
166. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989) (Brennan, J, plurality opinion). In
Price Waterhouse, a woman was denied partnership at a large accounting firm because, it was said, she
"should 'walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry:" Id. at 235. The Court condemned the denial as based upon "sex
stereotyping," which it held was illegal because "'[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against
individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."' Id. at 251 (quoting City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)). Price Waterhouse perfectly exemplifies the dominant
conception. It sets forth a simple and powerful principle thatwould obliterate gender conventions.
How far we are from any such likelihood may be seen in cases such as Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978), which refused to extend Title VII protection to claims of
discrimination on the basis of effeminacy. Smith in fact uses Willingham's "sex plus" doctrine, see
supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text, to reject the claim of a man who argued that he had been
"discriminated against because ... as a male, he was thought to have those attributes more generally
characteristic of females and epitomized in the descriptive 'effeminate."' Id. at 327. Despite Hopkins,
Smith is still regarded by "courts and commentators ... as good law." Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 3 n.3 (1995); see also Barbara Lindemann, Paul Grossman,
& Paul W. Cane, Jr., I EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 475-78 (3d ed. 1996). It remains more or
less standard Title VII doctrine that the statute does not prohibit employer actions enforcing stereotypic
masculine roles, as, for example, by barring men from wearing earrings, on the grounds that
"discrimination because of effeminacy, like discrimination because of homosexuality ... or
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preposterous doctrinal formulations and deprived of the vigorous debate
that would surely surround the reasons for the grooming and dress code
cases were they to be explicitly defended. Not only is the law stripped of
accountability, but the internal architecture and integrity of the law, which
is sustained by clear and purposeful doctrine, is undermined.
Coherent doctrine is important because it is the means by which law
directs courts to issues that are pertinent for legal intervention. My third
observation, therefore, is that the understandings brought to bear by the
sociological account will tend to focus judicial attention on what seems to
me the right question, the question that ought to govern the application of
antidiscrimination law. If the point of antidiscrimination law is to trans-
form existing social practices, then courts must ask what purpose the law
expects to accomplish by such transformations. The dominant conception
systematically obscures this question.'67 If the aim of the law is not in fact
to strike "at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
resulting from sex stereotypes, ''Iat then what is it?
Antidiscrimination law would be greatly advanced if it were simply to
pose this question in a sharp and useful way. We could then see, for exam-
ple, that the ambitions of the law vary depending upon the social practice
at issue. To pick an obvious example, if the nursing home residents in
Fesel had claimed a privacy right not to be touched by nurse's aides who
transsexualism ... does not fall within the purview of Title VII." DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co.,
608 F.2d 327, 332 (9th Cir. 1979); seealso Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir.
1989); Dobre v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286-87 (E.D. Pa. 1993). For an able
discussion, see Case. supra, at 36-75. For examples of similar holdings in antidiscrimination contexts
other than Title VII, see Rathert v. Village of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510.516 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 921 (1990) (upholding prohibition on earrings for male police officers); Star v. Gramley, 815
F. Supp. 276, 278-79 (C.D. I11. 1993) (upholding prohibition on women's garb and makeup for male
prison inmate).
167. Consider, for example, EEOCs 1969 explication of the BFOQ standard, which states that
"[]obs may be restricted to members of one sex"
For reasons of authenticity (actress, actor, model)
Because of community standards of morality or propriety (restroom attendant, lingerie sales
clerk)
In jobs in the entertainment industry for which sex appeal is an essential qualification.
EEOC, TOWARD JOB EQUALITY FOR WOMEN 5 (1969). The EEOC emphasizes, however, that "[j]obs
may not be restricted to members of one sex" because of
Assumptions related to the applicant's sex...
Preferences of co-workers, employers, clients or customers.
Id. We are thus instructed by the EEOC that gender discrimination is acceptable because of
"propriety," but unacceptable because of "preferences." An employer may engage in gender
discrimination to uphold "community standards of morality," but not to sustain "assumptions related to
the applicant's sex." These distinctions are obviously obscure; they can be illuminated only through a
clear explication of the aims and aspirations of Title VII. But because the dominant conception denies
these distinctions, it also suppresses any such effort at explication. As a consequence, the law is left as
confused and as incomplete as this EEOC pronouncement.
168. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 13 (1978)) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444
F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
[Vol. 88:1
HeinOnline -- 88 Cal. L. Rev. 36 2000
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES
were African American, their expectations would no doubt properly and
ruthlessly be overridden by Title VII. This is because antidiscrimination
law seeks to exercise a far more sweeping transformation of race than of
gender, as is evident in the fact that Title VII does not even contain a
BFOQ exception for race. 69 We are evidently more determined to imagine
individuals without race than we are individuals without sex.7  Although
clearly grasping such differences is a prerequisite for antidiscrimination
law to achieve its ends, these differences are difficult even to formulate
within the dominant conception.
This brings me to my fourth and concluding observation. Within the
dominant conception, explicit racial or gender classifications stand as
markers of the very potential for prejudice that creates the need for antidis-
crimination law. These classifications are thus rendered deeply suspect
because they are incompatible with the creation of individuals for whom
race and gender are irrelevant. Immanent within the dominant conception,
therefore, lies an almost irrepressible impulse to eliminate such classifica-
tions.
The impulse is so powerful that even in cases in which courts recog-
nize the inevitability of such classifications, as in the gendered grooming
cases, courts nevertheless cannot bring themselves to acknowledge that
169. The absence of a BFOQ for race was interrogated during the legislative debates over Title
VII. Senator Dirksen, for example, raised the question of "[a] movie company making an extravaganza
on Africa [which] may well decide to have hundreds of extras of a particular race or color to make the
movie as authentic as possible." 110 CONG. REac 7217 (1964). Senator Clark, a floor manager for the
statute, replied in a memorandum that "a director of a play or movie who wished to cast an actor in the
role of a Negro, could specify that he wished to hire someone with the physical appearance of a
Negro-but such a person might actually be a non-Negro. Therefore, the act would not limit the
director's freedom of choice." Id. Clark's response is notable on a number of grounds. It seems to
define race in some way other than as a socially constructed phenotype or "appearance," perhaps
biologically. (I am grateful to Reva Siegel for this observation.) Because Title VII also prohibits
discrimination on the basis of color, Senator Clark seems also to imply some differentiation between
"color" and the "appearance" of race. For a discussion of Title VII and discrimination on the basis of
"color," see Sam Scott, A New Category of "Color": Analyzing Albinism Under Title VII and the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 2 J. Gender, Race & Just. 493 (1999). Finally, Clark's emphasis on
appearance should be contrasted with EEOC's 1969 explication of the BFOQ requirement for sex,
which would allow a BFOQ "[flor reasons of authenticity (actress, actor, model)." EEOC, supra note
167, at 5. Evidently, according to Senator Clark, the absence of a BFOQ exception for race means that
employers must use "appearance" as a substitute for race, whereas the presence of a BFOQ exception
for sex means that employers can use "authenticity" as a criterion for sex. It is noteworthy, however,
that Senator Clark's memorandum is entirely unresponsive to Dirksen's inquiry if one believes that
race is not a biological fact but a social construction, and hence ultimately rooted in social appearance.
See Robert Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Wrs & MARY L. REv. 267,
296-97 (1991). If race is not understood as a biological fact, the absence of a BFOQ for race renders
the plight of the movie company genuinely puzzling. Yet contemporary courts continue to reaffum the
Clark rationale in such cases. See, e.g., Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468,474 n.10 (11 th Cir.
1999).
170. See Anthony Appiah, "But Would That Still be Me?" Notes on Gender, "Race," Ethnicit', as
Sources of "Identity," 87J. PHIL. 493,497 (1990) ("'Racial' ethical identities are for us ... apparently
less conceptually central to who one is than gender ethical identities.").
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they are accepting explicit gender categories. The impulse is particularly
puissant in cases dealing with affirmative action, and this creates odd theo-
retical tensions. For example, many of the very persons who would clearly
perceive the limitations of the dominant conception when manifested in the
Santa Cruz ordinance, and who would dismiss the ordinance as absurd,
might well also resist affirmative action on the basis of a visceral opposi-
tion to explicit racial and gender categories that no doubt flows directly
from the dominant conception.
A virtue of the sociological account is that it has the capacity to tame
this irresistible impulse to suppress explicit racial and gender classifica-
tions. If antidiscrimination law were to reorient itself around the project of
purposively reshaping the social practices of race and gender, explicit
racial or gender classifications may or may not be suspect, depending upon
whether they affect race or gender practices in ways that are compatible
with the purposes of the law.
This is exactly the perspective adopted by the Supreme Court when it
was forced to face the difficult and controversial question of whether Title
VII prohibited the use of explicit racial and gender classifications for
purposes of affirmative action. In United Steelworkers v. Weber..' and
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 7 1 Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, reasoned from "the historical context" 73 of the Act in order to an a-
lyze the relationship between such classifications and what he took to
be the Act's purpose, which was "to break down old patterns
of... segregation and hierarchy."'74 Whether or not one agrees with
Brennan's controversial use of legislative history, and whether or not one
agrees with his characterization of the ultimate goal of Title VII,'"1
Brennan's great achievement in these cases was to break through the usual
Title VII rhetoric of "stereotypes"' 76 in order to engage in precisely the
kind of inquiry that the sociological account would encourage.
At the outset of this Lecture, I promised that by its conclusion we
would come face to face with Brennan's contribution in Weber. We are
now in a position to appreciate that accomplishment. It lies in Brennan's
ability to shake free of the dominant conception and to focus directly on
the issue that ought to underlie antidiscrimination law, which is the nature
of the law's aims in seeking historically to transform existing practices of
171. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
172. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
173. Weber. 443 U.S. at 201.
174. Id. at 208; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 208).
175. On the controversial nature of Brennan's interpretation of Title VII, compare Ronald
Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 316 (1985), with Bernard D.
Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment,
47 U. CHI. L. REv. 423 (1980).
176. See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,707-09 (1978).
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race and gender. Unfortunately, however, Brennan's opinions in Weber
and Johnson remain isolated instances within a jurisprudence that still
speaks as though race and gender could be placed behind a screen and
made to disappear.
The impulse to suppress explicit racial and gender classifications is
highly pronounced in decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of
the Federal Constitution. It is fair to read the constitutional manifestation
of this impulse as also reflecting (at least in part) the influence of the
dominant conception. Constitutional opinions regularly express the
ambition to erase "stereotypic notions"'7 by requiring the state to focus
upon "individual men and women" '79 for whom race and gender would be
"irrelevant..... The urge to transcend history is thus frequently apparent in
the rhetoric of these opinions.
One possible consequence of the dominant conception within consti-
tutional jurisprudence is the line of cases that scrutinize laws that employ
racial or gender classifications on their face differently than laws that are
facially neutral. It is standard constitutional doctrine that the former should
receive stringent and frequently fatal judicial review,"' whereas the latter
should receive at best cursory consideration.' This is true even for those
facially neutral laws that have significantly retrograde effects upon prac-
tices of race or gender.' This is odd doctrine, however, if the purpose of
antidiscrimination law is to transform these practices.
I strongly suspect that the insights of the sociological account would
soften this sharp and consequential distinction between facially neutral
laws and laws that employ explicit racial and gender classifications. The
sociological account both de-emphasizes the singularity of racial and gen-
der classifications and enhances the visibility of the multiple ways in
which facially neutral laws affect existing practices of race and gender. It
thus encourages us to inquire whether these effects are consistent or incon-
sistent with the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. Of course, on
reflection, we might come to believe that the purposes of the Equal
177. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
178. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,725 (1982).
179. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT
133 (1975)).
181. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).
182. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Such laws are scrutinized to determine if they have a discriminatory purpose. See Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). Because of "disparate impact" analysis, Title VII law is a good deal
more sensitive than constitutional law about the effect of facially neutral regulations on practices of
gender and race. See supra note 52.
183. See Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 270 (1979) (upholding constitutionality of
state statute favoring veterans in civil service hiring despite fact that over 98% of benefitted class was
male).
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Protection Clause are not to modify existing practices of race and gender,
but instead to reshape governmental processes of decision making in ways
oblivious to their effects on these practices. I" But this is precisely the kind
of debate that we ought explicitly to engage.
VI
We have traveled a long distance from our initial consideration of
Santa Cruz's strange anti-lookism ordinance. The eccentricity of that law
enabled us to register unease at the project of systematically effacing the
social world. And yet we can now see that this same project also underlies
the general self-conception of American antidiscrimination law. As an
alternative to that project, therefore, I have offered an account of antidis-
crimination law as an institutional intervention designed to transform,
rather than to transcend, existing practices of gender and race. I have dis-
cussed four considerations bearing on the practical differences between
these two ways of imagining the design of antidiscrimination law. These
considerations sound roughly in the dimensions of accountability, doctrinal
integrity, purposive clarity, and an obsessive and dysfunctional focus on
explicit racial classifications.
I do not insist that these considerations compel us to abandon the
dominant conception, for the latter has served us well over the years in
driving important and far-reaching changes in the social practices of gen-
der and race. The point is certainly debatable. But I do insist that the
sociological account more accurately captures how antidiscrimination law
actually functions. Courts have in fact been compelled systematically to
disguise and contort their judgments so as to render them compatible with
the surface logic of the dominant conception.
Brennan's achievement in Weber was precisely to have crafted an
opinion that escaped this compulsion by forthrightly grounding its holding
within a framework that accepts the basic understanding of antidiscrimina-
tion law advanced by the sociological account. It is my hope that this
Lecture has enabled us to recognize the significance of that achievement
and to pose in an intelligible way the question of whether it is an accom-
plishment we should desire to emulate.
184. Alternatively, we might also conclude that, having assimilated the insights of the sociological
account, facially neutral laws would reshape existing practices of race and gender in ways more
consistent with constitutional imperatives than laws that employ explicit racial and gender
classifications. See Robert Post, Introduction: After Bakke, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION:
AFmRmATIVE ACTION 18-20 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998).
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